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Albert W. Stone**
* This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Montana University
Joint WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH CENTER which granted
funds to support the research under the Water Resources Research Act
of 1964. (P.L. 88-379, July 17, 1964, 2nd Sess., 88th Cong.)
Professor of Law, University of Montana. Member of the California
Bar. B.A., University of California, 1943; LL.B., Duke University, 1948.
There is neither a statute nor, a recent case defining the right of
tHie public to make recreational uses of the water which flows over
private lands in Montana. ' But surely with the pressure of more people
and the explosive expansion of their recreational uses of water it is iii-
evitable tO t colflicts will mouint between recrcationists and landowners
which will compel the defining of the p)ublics right to usc waters over-
lying private lands. it will happen every time a landowner wishes to
fill in and build structures over his lake or stream land or otherwise
interfere vitli or )rohibit members of the public from the use of the
overlying waters. The question of what are the public's rights is al-
ready perplexing personlel in state agencies and persons in wildlife
and sportsmen's organizations;2 there is an equal, opposite, and justi-
fiable concern on the part of ranchers and homeowners whose lands
lie alongside of lakes and streams." All of those people seek some legal
'There are a few statutes and a case which should be acknowledged as having to do
with such-public or recreational uses. REvISED CODES OF MONTANA, §89-501 (1947)
[hereinafter cited R.C.M. 1947] states: I'Navigable waters and all streams of sufficient
capacity to transport the products of the country are public ways for the purposes of
navigation and such transportation ..." but does not speak of any recreational uses,
and does not state what liberties are permissible in the course of navigation and
transportation. R.C.M. 1947, § 26-306 permits the licensing of private fishponds on
artificial lakes or ponds although it does not confer upon the licensee a water right
to -supply such ponds or lakes. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-801 (2) authorizes the Fish and
Game Commission to appropriate water in certain particular streams for preservation
of fish and wildlife habitat. See also R.C.M. 1947, §§ 26-336 to -338 pertaining to
navigable waters. The case, Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 596, 241 P. 328,
331, 42 A.L.R. 937 (1925) contains language which would lead to the conclusion that
the public has no reereational rights on waters where the beds are privately owned.
That case will be discussed in some detail in Part II hereof.
'The State Water Resources Board is currently working on draft legislation which
would affect public recreational rights and-is faced with problems concerning those
rights in proposed water conservancy districts. The Fish and Game Department
provides access to recreational water but members express uncertainty as to what
the public can do in both navigable and non-navigable streams after access is
gained. The Montana Conservation Council is working on legislation which, among
many other things, would clarify public rights. This list is only suggestive and
is far from exhaustive.
'The author has witnessed conflicts along such streams as the Bitterroot River and
Rock Creek, where landowners have obstructed the channel or otherwise attempted to
interfere with persons who wish to float or to wade while fishing.
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background to enable themselves to cope with the increasing incidents of
conflict. This article is intended to assist by discussing that background. 4
Before attempting to deal directly with Montana's prospects for
legal developments which will affect the ways of life of recreationists
and landowners alike, it is first necessary to review developments which
have already occurred in the law elsewhere in the United States, for
it is that law which will probably guide our courts and lawmakers in
the formulation of law in Montana. These more general developments
elsewhere have already been analyzed and discussed in previous writings
by this author 5 and by others,6 but a review of them will set a perspec-
tive for our own development. Following that review, this paper will
discuss the legal position of Montana-if it can be said to have defined
one-with respect to recreational use of water.
I. GENERAL REVIEW:
THE LAW GOVERNING RECREATIONAL USES OF WATER.
A. Navigability.
The word "navigability" has been properly described as "chameleon
in character, '" 7 for it has different meanings and definitions as it is
used for different purposes. One cannot properly use the word without
an understanding of the differences of meanings and an awareness of
the purpose for which he is using it.
1. Navigability for the purpose of determining title.
In 1842, a case arose involving litigation over an oyster fishery off
the coast of New Jersey, which required a determination of the title to
lands under tidal waters." The United States Supreme Court found that
title to these beds was originally in the British Crown, that each of the
thirteen original colonies succeeded to that title when they won their in-
dependence, and that there was no subsequent cession of that title to the
United States or to anyone else upon the formation of the Union. So the
original states have held title to these beds underlying navigable waters
ever since the Revolutionary War.
'This article is pointed toward concerned Montanans and so differs from those law
review articles aimed at a national audience of persons specializing in the area
of its subject.
'Stone, "Public Rights in Water," CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, Chap. 3,
§37 (1967).
"The excellent study, Johnson and Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds
on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1 (1967) has been most
helpful in the review that follows. See also Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal
Union, 10 BUFFALO L. REV. 427 (1961); Munro, Public v. Private: The Status of
Lakes, 10 BuFFALo L. REV. 459 (1961); Maloney and Plager,. Florida's Lakes:
Problems in a Water Paradise, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1960); Waite, Public Rights
to Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 WIs. L. REV. 335 (1958).
'Johnson and Austin, supra note 6.
'Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
[Vol. 32
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Three years later the same court held that states subsequently ad-
mitted to the Union were admitted on an "equal footing" and that there-
fore they also took title to the beds of their coastal navigable waters
upon their admission to the Union.0 In effect, then, there was a cession
to the new states by the federal government of title to the lands under
navigable waters at the time that the federal territories became states:
the United States reserved title to the upland, subject to various public
land laws, but title to the beds of navigable waters was automatically
transferred to new states. In a long line of cases, this doctrine has been
applied to inland non-tidal waters as well as to tidal waters, confirming
state ownership of the lands beneath navigable lakes and streams to the
high-water mark.10
With respect to lands beneath inland non-tidal waters which were
not navigable, there was no change of ownership upon the occurrence of
statehood, so the federal government simply retained ownership of the
beds of such streams as well as the upland.1 Upon disposition of lands
under the various federal land laws, title to the beds of these streams
was conveyed to various riparian patentees and thus was simply a part
of the newly settled private land. 12
But how does one tell whether a particular body of water is navig-
able for the purpose of determining whether the bed of a lake or stream
was ceded to the state or patented to private ownership? We have been
taught to use an often repeated quotation from an 1870 decision of the
United States Supreme Court:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when
they are used or are susceptible of being used in their ordinary con-
dition as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are
or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water.3
The Court's language is imprecise and therefore difficult to apply.
It is made still more difficult by certain important refinements con-
cerning its application. One refinement is that for the purpose of de-
termining title navigability must be determined as of the date the state
0Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845).
'
0E.g., United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64
(1926) ; United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil &
Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891);
Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324(1876). The last three cited cases assumed that the states could use their own law
for determining navigability of title; the first three establish that the federal test
governs.
"State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330, 332 (1949). See cases cited, supra
note 10.
"State, by Burnquist v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 116, 63 N.W.2d 278, 286 (1954).
"The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
1971]
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acquired statehood, because it was precisely then that there was a ces-
sion (albeit unexpressed, undeclared) to the new state of the beds of
navigable water.' 4 So, as the issue of title inexorably arises from time to
time today and will arise in the future, fading evidence must be scruti-
nized to determine the susceptibility of a stream's use for commerce at
a day long past. And thus the landowner who can trace his title back to
a federal patent will eventually find out whether he or the state has
owned his subaqueous land for perhaps the last century or so. Satis-
factory evidence of trade and travel (or absence of trade and travel)
on water at the time of statehood may be difficult or impossible to ob-
tain now, and cannot become easier to prove in the future.
The language of the Supreme Court quoted above 15 comes from a
case involving navigability for the purpose of federal regulation of com-
merce, but the case has frequently been used without discrimination in
cases concerned with title determinations.16 Its language suggests that
navigability is determined by the susceptibility of the water for com-
mercial use in its "ordinary condition" without need for improvements.
That is a likely interpretation but we cannot yet be sure. Since it is
now the law that navigability for commerce may occur at any time that
it becomes feasible to improve a waterway for commerce,1" it is possible
that the Supreme Court may hold either (1) a stream was navigable at
the date of statehood if it could later have been made navigable by
reasonable improvements, or (2) it was then navigable if it could have
been made so by improvements which would have been reasonable back
when statehood was acquired. We must await Supreme Court clarifica-
tion of this aspect of applying the language of the case which we are
working with, but in the meantime we are advised in an article in the
Natural Resources Journal that neither of those two qualifications is
likely to be adopted because they seem to somewhat alter the tenor of
the Court's original language and they would introduce further un-
certainty into title determinations.'"
Exactly how much trade and travel is required to qualify a stream
as navigable at the date of statehood depends upon the individual char-
acteristics of the water in question and upon the local activity of the
time.' 9 An early leading case stated:
... [T]he true test of the navigability of a stream does not depend
on the mode by which commerce is, or may be conducted, nor the
difficulties attending navigation. If this were so, the public would
be deprived of the use of many of the large rivers of the country
over which rafts of lumber of great value are constantly taken to
market.
"Cases cited, supra notes 9-12.
IBall, supra note 13.
'
6Utah, supra note 10 at 83; Brewer-Elliott Oil, supra note 10 at 86; Packer, supra
note 10 at 666.
-United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
18Johnson and Austin, supra note 6 at 18-19.
19Utah, supra note 10 at 87; Appalachian Electric, supra note 17 at 407-10.
[Vol. 32
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It would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a
river was capable of being navigated by steam or sail vessels, it
could not be treated as a public highway. The capability of use by
the public for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the
true criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than the extent
and manner of that use. If it be capable in its natural state of being
used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the com-
merce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in
law a public river or highway.'
Navigability for title purposes cannot be determined by examin-
ing whether a body of water has been meandered on the maps of the
U.S. government survey.21 If the surveyor's lines run across the body of
water in disregard of its presence, it shows that the surveyor thought
the water so insignificant that any later patentee should pay for the
underwater acreage just as he would the uplands. 2 2 If, however, the sur-
veyor has drawn lines along the vicinity of the edge of the water and
stopped his survey lines at those boundary lines, it is said that the body
of water was "meandered," and it shows that the surveyor thought that
the water was so significant that a later patentee would not have to
pay for the subaqueous acreage.23 But navigability for title purposes is
strictly a federal question, and the final arbiter is the United States Su-
preme Court.24 That Court has given scant consideration to the fact that
on the government survey the stream or lake was or was not meandered.2 5
2. Navigability for federal regulation of interstate commerce.
As has been noted, the cases determining navigability for purposes
of ownership of the beds under waters relied on the definitions of nav-
igability developed in cases concerned with the federal jurisdiction over
commerce in navigable waters. 2 6 But the application of tests for navig-
ability for the purpose of commerce does not require going back to the
date of admittance to statehood, or indeed, back anywhere. Navigation
for federal commerce jurisdiction may arise in the future if a stream can
be made into an avenue of commerce by reasonable improvements. It
does not depend upon the "natural and ordinary condition" of the water
under consideration. There is no more authoritative expression of cri-
teria for navigability for commerce than this language by Justice Reed
of the United States Supreme Court:
To appraise the evidence of navigability on the natural condition only
of the waterway is erroneous. Its availability for navigation must
mThe Montello, 37 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1874).
"This popularly held belief is erroneous. Oregon, supra note 10; Oklahoma v. Texas,
258 U.S. 574, 585 (1922); Hardin, supra note 10 at 380; Railroad v. Schurmeir,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272, 286-87 (1868).
2Oklahoma, supra note 21; Schurmeir, supra note 21.
=1d.
"Cases cited, supra note 21.
"' 'A legal inference of navigability is said to arise from the action of the surveying
officers who, when surveying the lands in that region, ran a meander line along
the northerly bank and did not extend the township and section lines across the river.
But this has little significance . . . Besides, those officers were not clothed with
power to settle questions of navigability." Oklahoma, supra note 21 at 585.
"Cases cited, supra note 16.
1971]
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also be considered. 'Natural and ordinary condition' refers to volume
of water, the gradients and the regularity of the flow. A water-
way otherwise suitable for navigation, is not barred from that clas-
sification merely because artificial aids must make the highway
suitable for use before commercial navigatiou may be undertaken....
Of course there are difficulties in applying these views. Improve-
ments that may be entirely reasonable in a thickly populated, highly
developed, industrial region may have been entirely too costly for
the same region in the days of the pioneers. The changes in engi-
,neering practices or the coming of new industries with varying
classes of freight may affect the type of the improvement. Although
navigability to fix ownership of the river bed or riparian rights is
determined as the cases just cited in the notes show, as of the forma-
tion of the Union in the original states or the admission to state-
hood of those formed later, navigability, for the purpose of the
regulation of commerce, may later arise. . . . It cannot properly be
said that the federal power over navigation is enlarged by the im-
provements to the waterways. It is merely that improvements make
applicable to certain waterways the existing power over commerce.'
3. Navigability for public use.
Of course, if a stream is navigable for title purposes, the bed nor-
mally belongs to the state, and so the public has the right to use the
waters ;28 and if it is navigable for purposes of commerce, then travel
and transportation on the water are under the jurisdiction of the federal
government and again the public can generally make use of the water.29
But each of these determinations of navigability has to do with problems
of federalism: does the state or the United States own the land under
the water; and who has jurisdiction to regulate the use of the water.
Those determinations of navigability have to do with a state's relation-
ship to the United States rather than with the state's relationships with
its citizens. Neither a determination of navigability or non-navigability
for commerce nor for title need have anything to do with the body of
internal state law which governs the use of property and the activities
of citizens within a state, in connection with water over which the fed-
eral government exercises no paramount jurisdiction. 30 When the prob-
lems of federalism are separated from the problems between citizens con-
cerning water use, the latter problems can be dealt with simply as mat-
ters of intrastate law, unencumbered by definitions and determinations
which are neither pertinent nor useful.
Many state courts have developed a broad definition of navigability
for their intrastate purpose of determining what waters the public may
resort to, frequently requiring only that the water be capable of float-
ing a skiff, a canoe, or most frequently a log.31 In some of the earlier
2Appalachian Electric, supra note 17 at 407-09.
2Cases cited, supra note 10.
laid.
OJohnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689, 694 (1960). See also, Duval
v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959); Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash.2d 815, 296 P.2d
1015 (1956); Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
aCollins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 432, 11 N.W.2d 193 (1942); Johnson v. Johnson, 14
Idaho 561, 95 P. 499, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1240 (1908); Village of Bloomer v. Town
of Bloomer, 128 Wis. 297, 107 N.W. 974 (1906); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn.
[Vol. 32
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state cases the courts assumed that the bed of the body of water had
to be owned by the public for there to be a right of public use,3 2 and
also that the criterion for determining title was a state rather than a
federal test of navigability.33 That latter assumption subordinated prob-
lems of federalism to intrastate law, and so permitted the courts to
hold that a stream was navigable (for title and therefore for public use)
whenever the waters in question were susceptible of substantial recrea-
tional use. The 1893 decision in Lamprey v. Metcalf34 uses an approach,
rationale, and language which others have followed:
* . . yet we have extended the meaning of that term [navigable]
so as to declare all waters public highways which afford a channel
for any useful commerce, including small streams, merely floatable
for logs at certain seasons of the year .... Certainly we do not see
why boating or sailing for pleasure should not be considered navi-
gation, as well as boating for mere pecuniary profit. . . . To hand
over all these lakes to private ownership, under any old or narrow
test of navigability, would be a great wrong upon the public for
all time, the extent of which cannot, perhaps, be now even antici-
pated.'
More recent federal cases have established that one of the assump-
tions underlying the more liberal state cases on public uses was erro-
neous: that the criterion for determining title was a state rather than
a federal test of navigability. 6 But title determination is a problem
in the state's relationship to the federal government and should require
a uniformly applied federal test. The state courts can continue to use
their own self-developed liberal definitions of navigability for their
separate purpose of regulating intrastate uses of the waters of the state
by citizens of the state. The recognition of a separate state purpose
in defining waters suitable to substantial public beneficial use has en-
abled the state courts to establish a trend favoring public use.
3 7
Shoreline owners on western lakes have long paddled their canoes,
swum, and waterskied all over the surface of lakes without regard to
whose land they may have floated over. They have simply assumed
that legal access to a particular lake carried with it a right to share
the use of the lake's surface. That popular assumption has been vindi-
181, 53 N.W. 1139, 18 L.R.A. 670, 38 Am. St. Rep. 541 (1893); Olson v. Merrill,
42 Wis. 203 (1877); Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308 (1874).
8Griffith v. Holmon, 23 Wash. 347, 63 P. 239 (1900); Lamprey, supra note 31; Gaston
v. Mace, 33 W.Va. 14, 10 S.E. 60, 5 L.R.A. 392 (1889); Railroad v. Brooks, 39 Ark.
403, 43 Am.Rep. 277 (1882); Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 91 Am.Dec. 58 (1866);
Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 578, 73 Am.Dec. 439 (1859); Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich.
520, 59 Am.Dec. 209 (1853); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9 (1849).
mCases cited, supra note 32.
"Lamprey, supra note 31.
'*Id. at 1143. See also, Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937); Roberts
v. Taylor, 74 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921).
"Holt, supra note 10 at 55-56.
1
7Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wash.2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d
137 (Wyo. 1961) ; Johnson, supra note 30; Snively, supra note 30; Elder v. Delcour,
364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal.App.2d 738, 238
P.2d 128 (1951); State v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
19711
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cated in recent eases which have held that on non-navigable (for title)
lakes where the bed is privately owned, persons who obtain legal access
also have the right to make reasonable use of the entire lake38 and can
prohibit or remove obstructions which would unreasonably interfere
with their use. "') These decisions are logically as applicable to a stream
as a lake, and just as logically for the benefit of members of the
public as for riparian landowners, if the stream is susceptible to sub-
stantial public use. Consider, for example, this language from a 1952
Wisconsin ease:
... It is no longer necessary in determining navigability of streams
to establish a past history of floating logs, or other uses of com-
merical transportation, because any stream is 'navigable in fact'
which is capable of floating any boat, skiff or canoe, of the shal-
lowest draft used for recreational purposes .
B. Public waters.
Two Rocky Mountain states, New Mexico and Wyoming, have
premised their conclusions upon a proposition long recognized in West-
ern states: that waters do not belong to the owners of land through
which they flow; they belong to the public. 4' The New Mexico case,
State v. Red River Valley Co.,4 2 arose as a result of the construction by
the Army Engineers of the Conchas Dam on the South Canadian River.
Defendant had owned the land, but conveyed the damsite as well as a
flowage easement (not the ownership) covering the large area to be
flooded, reserving to himself all other rights to the area affected by
the flowage easement. The state brought this action for a declaration
whether it could open these waters, over private land, to public fishing.
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that fishing is a beneficial use
which pertains to public waters. It said:
We hold that the waters in question were, and are, public waters;
and that appellee has no right of recreation or fishery distinct
from the right of the general public.. . . The right of the public,
the state, to enjoy the use of the public waters in question cannot be
foreclosed by any circumstances relied upon.'
The Wyoming case, Day v. Armstrong,44 arose because the plaintiff
sought a declaration of his right and that of the public to float the
non-navigable North Platte River across defendant's lands. Some of the
pertinent statements of the court follow:
. . . the actual usability of the waters is alone the limit of the
public's right to so employ them ..
OJohnson, supra note 30; Duval, supra note 30; Snively, supra note 30.
8Bach, supra note 37; Duval, supra note 30; Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659, 23
N.W.2d 117 (1946).
"Mueneh v. Public Service Comm., 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (1952).
"Brennan v. Jones, 101 Mont. 550, 567, 55 P.2d 697, 702 (1936) ; Allen v. Petrick,
69 Mont. 373, 377, 222 P. 451, 452 (1924); Norman v. Corbley, 32 Mont. 195, 202,
79 P. 1059, 1060 (1905).
"2Red River Valley, supra note 37.
8Id. at 434.
"Day, supra note 37.
"Id. at 143.
[Vol. 32
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The title to waters within this State being in the State, is con-
comitance, it follows that there must be an easement in behalf of
the State for a right-of-way through their natural channels for
such waters upon and over lands submerged by them or across the
bed and channels of streams or other collections of waters ...
The waters not being in trespass upon or over the lands where they
naturally appear, they are available for such uses by the public
of which they are capable ..
C. Reasonableness, or limitations on the public use.
There is good reason for concern over the privacy and enjoyment
of life by the riparian landowner. Justice Sadler, dissenting in State
v. Red River Valley Co., expressed it:
The common law has dramatized the sanctity of the home and
premises of the individual against invasion by strangers and tres-
passers in the age-old maxim: 'A man's house is his castle.' So
it was and immemorially has been but no more, to view the matter
realistically, since henceforth a rod, reel and fly are to perform
the office of a writ of entry.
4 7
In the Wyoming case of Day v. Armstrong,4  although the Court
protected the public's right to float the North Platte, somewhat illogically
it denied a right to wade the stream, saying that such a use would be
a trespass on the privately owned bed. Perhaps the Court was indirectly
attempting to limit the public to streams which are large enough to
permit floating, but to restrict the public from wading up rivulets
through landowners' farmyards. That will be the effect of the decision,
but it may go too far in restricting uses of state waters to floating.
Wading while fishing and fishing from the streambank of non-navigable
(for title) streams has become prohibited in Wyoming.
There is very little law directly restricting public uses of public
waters, either for the benefit of members of the public by affording
protection from over-congestion and unsuitable uses by others, or for
the benefit of landowners who ne'ed similar protection. The problem
has been considered in an article by Messrs. Johnson and Austin, who
state:
Although few cases have raised the question of legal controls of
lake or stream use to date, many more will undoubtedly arise in
the future as greater pressure is put on the smaller streams and
lakes of the West. The very purpose for which these bodies of
water are thought desirable, recreation and homesite location, may
be thwarted unless some rational means for allocating their use is
found. Whether the courts articulate a 'nuisance' theory, or one
based on 'riparian rights,' the standard of 'reasonableness' will
probably be controlling. Just what this will mean in a given state
will have to be worked out on a case by case basis.
1). Navigability, title and public use: conclusion.
Having now considered the historical background and the modern
developments pertaining to the public recreational use of water, several
'Old. at 145.
"7Red River Valley, supra note 37 at 456.48Day, supra note 37.
"Johnson and Austin, supra note 6 at 51.
InIj
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conclusions emerge. The problems which call for our careful attention
and for resolution are created by conflicts between private landowners
and members of the public who seek recreation. Solutions to the prob-
lems will require evaluation of the suitability of particular bodies of
water to particular uses by the public, as well as where and how the
public should be regulated for its own benefit and for the benefit of
the private landowner. It is time to stop worrying about "navigability"
and "title ;,,.O they do not contribute to a solution, and they distract
and divert our attention from what is relevant to a solution.
11. MONTANA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS.
A. Problems.
The defendant trespassed also when he waded up and down Fall
Creek fishing. The channel of the creek belonged to the plaintiff
(1 Tiffany on Real Property see. 302), and while the plaintiff did
not own the fish, ferae vaturae, lie had the exclusive right to fish
for them while they were in the waters of Fall Creek within his
land. (26 C.J. 598.) It would seem clear that a man has no right
to fish where he has no right to be. So it is held uniformly that
the public have no right to fish in a non-navigable body of water,
the bed of which is owned privately.
-Callaway, C. J., in Herrin v. Sutherland,
74 Mont. 587, 596, 241 P. 328, 331, 42
A.L.R. 937, 942 (1925).
The foregoing opinion, written in 1925, represents the Montana
Supreme Court's only attempt to deal with the rights of the public
to make recreational use of waters over private land. But there are
some good reasons why the Court may choose not to adhere to so
simple, and essentially mechanical a solution of the conflict between
landowners and reereationists. Curiously, it was entirely unnecessary
to any decision in the ease for the court to announce that recreationists
have no right to use water over private land. More curiously, the case
was not vigorously contested, and so the Court was not called upon
to give the question of public recreational rights the serious and
thoughtful consideration that it deserved. These weakening aspects
of the case come forth when one considers the case in detail.
The complaint in Iferrin v. Sutherland'1 alleged eight causes of
action arising out of defendant's approaching plaintiff's land from
the navigable Missouri River, trampling the banks along plaintiff's
land while hunting and fishing, breaking plaintiff's fence, entering
plaintiff's fast land, and fishing in a small pond and the small Fall
Creek on plaintiff's land. In all lut the seventh cause of action, plain-
tiff expressly alleged that defendant trespassed above the high-water
5°Johnson, supra note 30 at 694.
"Herrin, supra note 1.
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mark of the Missouri or elsewhere on plaintiff's uplands; and in the
seventh, plaintiff implicitly alleged a trespass on his uplands because
he alleged that defendant fished in a pond and stream which were
entirely surrounded by plaintiff's land.5 2 So defendant necessarily tres-
passed on plaintiff's uplands in the seventh cause of action because
he had to obtain access to the landlocked pond and stream. The Su-
preme Court expressly inferred such a trespass."'
That part of the opinion in Herrin v. Sutherland which declares
that "the public have no right to fish in a non-navigable body of water,
the bed of which is owned privately"5 4 is seriously weakened by the
fact that each cause of action alleged explicitly or implicitly a trespass
by defendant which had no relationship either to water or to the bed
of a non-navigable body of water. Justice Calloway, writing for the
majority of the Court, found that plaintiff's complaint alleged a trespass
upon plaintiff's uplands in each of the eight causes of action. In dis-
cussing the second cause of action, the Justice did place emphasis upon
defendant's fishing in the non-navigable Fall Creek 55-a finding which
was unnecessary since the Justice also found, with respect to that
cause of action, that defendant trespassed on plaintiff's fast land when
he tramped upon and destroyed plaintiff's hay.5 6 So it was quite un-
necessary to the decision to state that defendant had no right to fish
Fall Creek.
Defendant put up a minimum defense. Notwithstanding that plain-
tiff had alleged a trespass on his uplands in each cause of action, de-
fendant entered a general demurrer: he conceded as true all of the
facts alleged by plaintiff and claimed that they did not constitute a
basis for a complaint. The demurrer was overruled by the trial court,
but defendant refused to file an answer in his own defense. So there
was no trial-merely the entry by the trial court of a default judgment.
Surprisingly, defendant appealed and the matter was submitted to the
Supreme Court on briefs, without appearance of counsel.5 7 It was not
extensively briefed.28  Of course the judgment was affirmed. In con-
curring, Justice Holloway pointedly and appropriately said: " . . . the
appeal does not merit serious consideration, but should be disposed of
summarily. .. 59
Leaving Herrin v. Sutherland,60 there is another aspect of Montana
law which deserves discussion because it is so different from the law
z 2 d. at 593.
1Id. at 600.
4Id. at 596, a part of the longer quotation which heads this section.5MId.
'Id. at 597.
57Id. at 589.
5Appellant's only brief was of thirteen pages, double spaced, printed, with lines only
31/2 inches long. Ruling Case Law is relied on generally, and the argument is general.
The nine cases cited do not really reach the gist of the complaint.5 Herrin, supra note 1 at 602.
'Herrin, supra note 1.
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elsewhere. Under federal law each state acquired title to the beds and
banks of navigable streams6 1 up to the high-water mark upon the occur-
rence of statehood. When later settlers patented riparian land from the
federal government they received title from the United States only
to the highwater mark of navigable streams because the state already
owned the land below that mark. But by statute6 2 and case law, 3
commencing in 1895, Montana has conceded to the riparian landowners
title extending to the low-water mark. The United States Supreme
Court has thought it permissible for a state to so concede property
already vested in the state for the benefit of the public,4 so each time
a person obtained a federal patent to land bordering a navigable stream
in Montana, the state generously conferred upon the federal patentee
the strip of land between high and low water, which the state had
owned since 1889.65
But ownership of subaqueous land is quite different from owner-
ship of dry land.66 That is illustrated by one of the well established
fundamentals of water law: with respect to those streams which are
navigable for both title and commerce, the states own the beds but
they do not have authority over the use of the overlying water-that
lies with the federal government. 67 In Gibson v. Kelly,6 8 the case which
first stated Montana's peculiar rule that private ownership extended
to low water, the Montana Supreme Court recognized that ownership
of land which is periodically covered with public water is a limited
ownership. The Court said:
It is true that while the abutting owner owns to the low-water
mark on navigable rivers, still the public have certain rights of
navigation and fishery upon the river and upon the strip in question.
Forty-six years after Gibson v. Kelly the Montana Supreme Court
rendered a decision on another matter which can be related to the
public's use of the private land adjacent to navigable or public water.
In Laden v. Atkeson,70 the plaintiffs owned a right-of-way for a ditch
across defendant's land, and maintained a dam in the river from which
their water was taken. Defendant refused to permit plaintiffs the
use of a road over defendant's land or the use of defendant's soil and
materials alongside the ditch. Plaintiffs desired the use of defendant's
"'.e., navigable for title purposes.
R.C.M., 1947, § 67-712; CIVIL CODE OF 1895, § 1291.
'Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 39 P. 517 (1895).
"Harden v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508 (1902); Barney, supra note 10; Hardin, supra note 10.
'R.C.M., 1947, § 67-712; CIVIL CODE OF 1895 § 1291; Gibson, supra note 63.
"Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash.2d .-- , 462 P.2d 232 (1969); Guilliams V. BeaverLake Club, 90 Ore. 13, 175 P. 437, 441-42 (1918); Willow River Club v. Wade, 100
Wis. 86, 76 N.W. 273, 275-76, 42 L.R.A. 305 (1898); cases cited, supra note 37.
•'United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960); United States
v.-Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Ditch Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
8Gibson, supra note 63.
Id. at 423.
TLaden v. Atkeson, 112 Mont. 302, 116 P.2d 881 (1941).
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road for access for maintenance, and the soil for maintenance materials.
The Supreme Court found that plaintiffs not only had an casement for
their ditch, but also a secondary casement "for the purpose of obtaining
full enjoyment of their primary easement consisting of their ditch right.
* . .,,7l So the Court held for the plaintiffs. If a private party is en-
titled to that which is necessary to obtain the full enjoyment of an case-
ment, there must be an analogous right in the public: the primary public
right is to travel on navigable streams and public waters, and that
carries with it a secondary easement to utilize the banks of the stream
as required to ensure full public enjoyment of its primary right, It
logically follows that members of the public should be permitted to
enter upon the uplands for the purpose of portaging around obstacles
or impassable places along a stream where that is necessary for travel
in or along the stream itself.
7 2
B. Can the public acquire a water right by beneficial use?
It was natural for our water laws to use the term "diversion" in
connection with the acquisition of a water right for a beneficial use.
Water rights law began its growth when mining and irrigation were
the only substantial uses of water, and diversion by weir and ditch
were physically necessary because there were no electric pumps or gas-
oline engines. Montana's codes bear witness to history in directing a
person desiring to appropriate water to post a notice "at the point of
intended diversion" 7 3 and to file with the county clerk a statement con-
taining the "name of the stream from which the diversion is made." '74
Mining and irrigation are still important uses of water, and a di-
version is still the principal means of putting the water to a bene-
ficial use. But now there are additional important uses of water, some
of which do not require a diversion. Indeed, for some uses a diversion
would damage the use: The generation of hydro-electric power and
the use for recreation are conspicuous examples. 75 Is it true or was it
ever true that to obtain a water right there must have been a diversion?
In Hutchins' authoritative treatise on water law, the emphasis is
placed upon the "beneficial use" rather than upon the means of trans-
porting or applying the water.76 Even the 1911 treatise by Weil empha-
nId. at 312.
"Elder, supra note 37; Laden, supra note 70.. R.C.M 1947, § 89-501: "Navigable
waters and all streams of sufficient capacity to transport the products of the country
are public ways . ..I
7
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-810.
7"Id.
"In Broadwater-Missouri Water Users' Assn. v. Montana Power Co., 139 F.2d 998,
998 (1944), the Power Company, "asserted the right by prior appropriation to the
use of all the waters of the Missouri River and its tributaries for the purpose of
operating certain hydro-electric plants-seven in number-located on the upper
reaches of that stream.''
' HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF' WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST, 314-20
(1942).
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sizes "beneficial use" rather than the means of use.77 An early Colorado
case says: "No principle in connection with the law of water rights is
more firmly established than that the application of water to bene-
ficial use is essential to a completed appropriation. 7 8 No "dam, ditch,
reservoir or other artificial means was used" for watering cattle in
one Nevada case, the court saying that if there must be a diversio'n
with intent to apply the water to a beneficial use, then "if the drinking
by cattle constitutes a diversion, then the necessary intent must be
that of the cattle. '79 If the use of water in a streambed by cattle is a
sufficient beneficial use to support a water right, can it be argued that
the use in the same manner by people is not? Beneficial use rather
than a diversion is the touchstone of a water right.8 0
The Montana Supreme Court has never closed the list of what
comprises a beneficial use. In Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warren,," the
Court recognized a right originated for a swimming pool and fish pond
and in Quigley v. McIntosh, 2 the court prohibited the use of water
for a fish pond, but it did so only because that use extended and
increased the use of water under a prior right acquired for other pur-
poses and would have injured other water right owners. The Court
protected a private use for fish ponds in a 1966 case8 3 and a Montana
statute authorizes the operation of such ponds. 4 If private persons can
acquire a right to a quantity or flow of water for swimming pools,
fish ponds, and the like, can it be argued that the public may not
acquire similar rights for similar beneficial uses? In Paradise Rainbow
v. 'Fish and Game Commission, the court said: "Under the proper
circumstances we feel that such a public interest should be recognized."8 5
C. Prospects.
There are some recent developments in Montana law, and some
recent proceedings in the Montana Legislature, which strongly indicate
that the public's interest in the recreational use of Montana waters will
be both protected and elaborated in the future.
In the most recent legislative session (1969), the Montana Legisla-
ture amended Revised Codes of Montana (1947) sec. 89-801, which is
the basic statute authorizing the acquisition of water rights. The
amendment authorizes the Fish and Game Commission to appropriate
'
TWEIL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES, 406-11, 418 (3rd ed., 1911).
"Conley v. Dyer, 43 Colo. 22, 95 P. 304, 306 (1908).
"Steptoe Live Stock Co. v. Gulley, 53 Nev. 163, 295 P. 772, 775 (1931).
"°City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal.App.2d 460, 52 P.2d 585 (1935) ; Steptoe, supra
note 79; In re Silvies River, 115 Ore. 27, 237 P. 322 (1925). (natural irrigation);
Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530 (1883). (no diversion, just a dam causing a meadow
to receive water).8
'Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warren, 103 Mont. 284, 62 P.2d 206 (1936).8
-Quigley v. McIntosh, 110 Mont. 495, 103 P.2d 1067 (1940).
"Paradise Rainbow v. Fish and Game Commission, 148 Mont. 412, 421 P.2d 717 (1966).
More will be said about this case in the subdivision which follows.
"1R.C.M. 1947, § 26-306.
"Paradise Rainbow, supra note 83 at 418-20.
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the waters of twelve recreational streams for the purpose of maintaining
stream flows necessary for the preservation of fish and wildlife habitat.8 6
This is legislation of the greatest significance, because it is a recognition
that recreational uses of Montana waters are beneficial uses. Water
will be appropriated-in effect, reserved-for such purposes.
This amendment also authorizes the reservation by the Fish and
Game Commission of other streams and rivers in addition to the twelve
named, if approved by the Water Resources Board, the State Soil Con-
servation Committee, the State Board of Health, and the Legislature.
8 7
The requirement of approval by so many agencies will make it a cum-
bersome or nearly impossible process to reserve additional streams. But
recognition of the public's interest has always been a step-by-step
process, and this part of the amendment is a step-albeit a step which
needs to have an obstruction removed.
There were three bills introduced into the 1969 Legislature which
were killed, but which are indicative of future legislation. The most
far-reaching was House Bill No. 337, which attempted a complete
recodification of Montana's surface and underground water rights law.
It necessarily was a lengthy piece of proposed legislation. Among its
many features was the express inclusion of fish, wildlife, and recreational
uses as beneficial uses 8 and that a right or reservation of waters
could be effected with or without a diversion of the water.8 9 Importantly,
it expressly recognized as existing rights the uses by the public for
recreational purposes as of the time that the public made a substantial
use of the water in question 0 It also provided for the reservation of any
public waters for existing or future uses and for maintaining adequate
streamflowf' It is likely that there will be more legislative activity on
this bill or other comparable proposals.92
Had it passed, Senate Bill No. 45 would have added the follow-
ing language to R.C.M. (1947) sec. 89-802:
Beneficial purposes shall include, but shall not be limited to, do-
mestic water, industrial water, irrigation, livestock water, municipal
water, public recreation, and the preservation, propegation, [sic]
and minimum habitat of fish and other wildlife; providing that di-
version, when not essential to beneficial application of the water, is
not required for protection of a right. (emphasis added.)
Quite obviously the italicized portions contained the purpose of
this amendment, because the rest of the text surely presented no inno-
vations. But in the Paradise Rainbows case, 93 to be discussed in more
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-801(2); Chap. 345, § 1, Laws of 1969.
87Id.
8'House Bill No. 337, § 3(4), 1969 Legislature.1Id. at § 3(5).
1Id. at § 3(7).
1Id. at § 30.
"Study and drafting are currently in progress by the Montana Conservation Council
and the Water Resources Board.
'Paradise Rainbow, supra note 83.
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detail later, the Montana Supreme Court suggested that the law of
Montana already encompasses the italicized portions. Therefore it
would be advisable for such legislation to contain a paragraph recogniz-
ing existing rights of the public to recreational uses, as was done in
H.B. 337.94 Such an inclusion would avoid the implications that the
public has not yet acquired rights and that the italicized wording was
intended to operate only prospectively.
House Bill No. 414 was introduced to authorize the Fish and Game
Commission to purchase water from reservoirs, and to assure that the
purchased water would remain in streams, augmenting their flow for
recreational uses. Purchases of water for recreational uses in streams
require different treatment from purchases of water for other purposes.
Most purchasers are unconcerned with stream volume of flow elsewhere
along the stream than at the point of intended diversion. It is quite
possible that the purchaser actually diverts little or none of the same
water which was released from the reservoir pursuant to his purchase.
That is because the stream may have been totally exhausted by upstream
irrigation uses, and the water which the purchaser diverts may have
come to his reach of the stream from drainage and return-flow from
upstream uses.
The situation is different for the Fish and Game Commission or a
sportsman's organization which purchases water for the purpose of aug-
menting stream-flow for recreational purposes. Here there is concern
over the flow of the stream elsewhere than at some particular point
of delivery. Neither fish nor fishermen can satisfactorily congregate
at a few points along a stream where there is sufficient water, and
neither fish nor fishermen desire water carrying heavy siltation. But
there is now no satisfactory means of protecting purchased water
throughout the length of a stream or a sizeable portion thereof.95 House
Bill No. 414 would have protected water purchased by the Fish and
Game Commission from other uses "from the point of release of such
waters and continue to the point or points of intended use."
Lastly, there is evidence that the Montana Supreme Court will de-
cree that the public has acquired water rights by its beneficial uses of
water for recreational purposes. In the recent Paradise Rainbows case, 96
one DePuy diverted water from Armstrong Spring Creek to Trail
Creek in 1957, where he used it in private fish ponds. DePuy looked
upon Trail Creek as a dry streambed which he artificially supplied
with the diverted water. If those were the facts, then Trail Creek was
artificial for the purpose of R.C.M. (1947) sec. 26-306 which authorizes
"House Bill, supra note 88.
OlThe Western Montana Fish and Game Association purchased water from the State
Water Conservation Board (now the Water Resources Board) to be delivered into the
Bitterroot River from 'the Red Rock Reservoir. The Association has been unable to
protect that water to keep it in the River.
"Paradise Rainbow, supra note 83.
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the operation of private fish ponds under license by the Fish and Game
Commission. The Commission licensed his operation from 1958 until
1965, when it refused licenses on the ground that Trail Creek was not
artificial. DePuy then brought mandamus to compel the issuance of
licenses, and the factual issue was whether Trail Creek was a natural
stream prior to DePuy's diversion of Armstrong Spring Creek into it.
The trial court found that it was not a natural stream and the Supreme
Court affirmed, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support
the trial court's conclusion. Therefore, DePuy could sustain his claim
that his ponds were artificial. It is significant that the Court here
protected an appropriation of water for the purpose of operating fish
ponds-a recreational beneficial use.
But there is more to this case. The Fish and Game Commission
had asked the Court for a mandatory injunction against DePuy to
compel him to install a fishladder on Armstrong Spring Creek. Neither
the trial court nor the Supreme Court found a strong enough factual
case for the Commission: the Commission had permitted the diversion
of Armstrong Spring Creek without a fishladder since the spring of
1957, and Armstrong Spring Creek was found to be but a short stream
and not a major migratory route for fish. The Commission had argued
that it was guarding a public right acquired by the public's beneficial
use of the stream for fishing. The Court held against the Commission
because there were insufficient facts to support the Commission's argu-
ment, but the Court's treatment of the issue was prophetic:
The Commission does maintain that the public has a prior right
in the waters of the creek which would require DePuy to release
some water through a fishladder. The public right urged by the
Commission would be based on the fact that the public had used the
creek as a fishing stream and natural fish hatchery before DePuy
built his dam. Under the rule of Bullerdick v. Hermsmeyer, 32
Mont. 541, 554, 81 Pac. 334, DePuy could not use the water to the
detriment of prior rights.
Such a public right has never been declared in the case law of this
state. California, an appropriation doctrine jurisdiction whose Con-
stitutional provisions relating to water rights are virtually the same
as Article III, sec. 15 of the Montana Constitution, has recognized
such a right and has upheld statutes requiring fishways. [citation]
Under the proper circumstances we feel that such a public interest
should be recognized. This issue will inevitably grow more pressing
as increasing demands are made on our water resources. An abun-
dance of good trout streams is unquestioanably of considerable value
to the people of Montana.
While the Commission's argument is plausible, we cannot yield to
it, given the facts at hand .... (emphasis added.)'
D. Conclusion.
No statute yet exists in Montana defining the conflicting rights
of landowners and recreationists, or settling whether the public has
acquired water rights for recreational uses by resorting to the water
for recreation, or determining whether a water right can be acquired
'Id. at 419-20.
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by a private person for recreation as for a fish pond or swimming pool.
While legislation is non-existent, case law is sparse: the Montana Su-
preme Court has not yet been called upoa to develop deliberately, the
law governing the conflict between landowners and recreationists in a
vigorously contested case, 98 nor, has the Court expressly held that
water rights can be obtained by either the public or a private person
for recreational purposes, although it has at least intimated that such
rights do exist. 9
Those in state agencies who hold responsibility for providing public
recreation, those members of the public who desire to make recreational
beneficial uses of the waters, and those landowners who desire privacy
and tranquillity are indeed frustrated and perplexed at the uncertain
and unsettled state of the law concerning the public's recreational uses
of Montana waters. Troublesome as it is, the tardy development of
doctrine in Montana is probably fortunate for the best long-term inter-
ests of the public. Had Montana's law been developed and settled
many years ago when the public's interest was not so pressing as it
now is, the makers of the law might not have given the careful con-
sideration to the public interest which that interest so strongly demands
today. Moreover, the experience and development in the law in other
states can be most helpful in guiding our own development. Free from
the encumbrances of fixed and settled statutes and precedents binding
us to the restrictions inherent in concepts of title, navigability, and
diversions of water, the Montana courts and legislature have today an
unrestricted opportunity to determine the public's rights to recrea-
tional use of Montana waters-waters which belong to the public.
"See comments on Herrin, supra note 1, in the text beginning at note 51.
"Paradise Rainbow, supra note 83; Quigley, supra note 82; Osnes Livestock, supra
note 81.
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